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Abstract: Making sense of alarms can be difficult on oil and gas platforms. Multilevel Flow
Modeling provides a structure for modelling plant functionality and inferring causes for alarms
and predicting consequences. Currently, Multilevel Flow Modeling has limited application for
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1. INTRODUCTION
Systems for plant wide fault diagnosis of causes and effects
are key to improving operator performance. For complex
and safety critical systems such as offshore oil and gas
production platforms, a faster and better diagnosis of
faults can improve the plant safety and productivity. In
this work, a Produced Water Treatment (PWT) pilot
plant has been modelled with Multilevel Flow Modeling
(MFM), and a fault has been emulated on the physical
plant. The MFM model has been used for inferring causes
to triggered alarms. The validity of the inferred causes
is analysed for the emulated fault, and related to what
operators experience.
Typical approaches to alarm management seek to filter,
group or rank alarms (Wang et al., 2016). Instead of
focusing on presenting alarms to an operator, MFM uses
causal and graph based models to interprets alarms and
infer root causes. An approach similar to MFM, has been
used to model plant causality and isolate the root cause of
plant wide oscillations. The method establishes a Signed
Directed Graph from transfer entropy of process signals,
and isolates the cause based on the reachability of control
loops in the graph (Hu et al., 2017). Other approaches
include alarm logic diagrams for identifying causes (Dubois
et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2010), and Bayesian Networks for
alarm prioritisation (Zhu et al., 2014). Recent focus has
also been on correlation and causality methods for process
signals or alarms (Yang et al., 2011, 2013).
MFM is a method for modelling goals and functions of pro-
cess systems. The method has been widely applied for of-
fline analysis of faults by Akio and Takahisa (2016); Khalil
et al. (2016); Xu et al. (2015); Zhao et al. (2015); Wu et al.
 The authors would like to thank the Danish Hydrocarbon Research
and Technology Centre for funding this project.
(2014); Lind and Zhang (2014), as an alternative to e.g.
Goal Tree Success Tree or Fault Tree Analysis (Johnson,
2013; Hurdle et al., 2007). Interest in on-line monitoring
and diagnostics has increased in numerous industries over
the past few years. For this reason, MFM is currently
being developed to provide on-line decision support. The
method has previously been applied for on-line diagnosis
of power plants (Larsson et al., 2007), nuclear power plants
(Larsson, 2007) and in the oil industry (Hu et al., 2015).
Currently the MFM methodology is being developed for
on-line fault diagnosis for operator decision support in the
oil and gas industry. Recent development includes an im-
proved modelling methodology by Lind (2017), cause and
consequence reasoning about control actions and response
by Zhang and Lind (2017), causality identification from
alarms by Kirchu¨bel et al. (2017), and model performance
evaluation by Nielsen et al. (2018). Initial results with on-
line fault diagnosis are presented here based on the current
MFM methodology.
The MFM methodology has been used to model a state
of the art PWT pilot plant at Aalborg University in
Esbjerg. As this plant is not used for industrial production,
standard operation has been defined for the purpose of
investigating the MFM methodology. For this reason,
operational setpoints and alarm limits have been defined
for this particular test.
2. PWT PILOT PLANT
The pilot plant at Aalborg University in Esbjerg is used
for PWT. For this test the subsystems shown in the P&ID
in Fig. 1 are used: support system, pipeline riser, three-
phase separator and hydrocyclone. Only water and air is
mixed as inflow, as no oil is used.
Proceedings of the 3rd IFAC Workshop on
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Fig. 1. P&ID of PWT Pilot Plant with the subsystems: Support, Pipeline Riser, Separator and Hydrocyclone.
The support system supplies compressed air for control
valves, and air for the water mixture to emulate well
gas. In addition the support system supplies water from
a storage tank MT02 with a pump WP01 controlled at
constant power. The water from the storage tank MT02,
is recirculated back to the same storage tank MT02. The
component, sensor, and valve names are shown in Fig. 1
and in Table 1. The valves CV12, CV13 and CV14 are
closed during the test, whereas CV22 is closed until being
used for emulating a misdirected flow.
The pipeline riser is used to deliver the mixture of water
and air from the ground level in the lab to the separator.
Slug control by using lift gas and a choke valve can be
applied as in Pedersen et al. (2014b,a, 2017), but is not
used in this test.
The three phase separator SEP1 separates the air and
water delivered from the pipeline riser. A sufficiently high
pressure is required to drive the water out of the separator.
The separator pressure PT14 is maintained by the control
valve AFM2 M at the air outlet, but also depends on the
water level. The oil outlet contains no liquid and is thus
closed at CV12. The control of the water level, and the
hydrocyclone is in Durdevic et al. (2017) explained as two
typical separate control structures for the hydrocyclone
HYD1 and the three-phase separator.
The hydrocyclone is commonly used for removing smaller
oil droplets from the produced water, and the separation
efficiency is based on the Pressure Drop Ratio (PDR)
and flow-split as described by Durdevic et al. (2017);
Bram et al. (2017). The underflow control valve of the
Table 1. Pilot plant sensors and valves.
Name System Function
PT01 Hydrocyclone HYD1 input pressure
PT02 Hydrocyclone HYD1 overflow pressure
PT03 Hydrocyclone HYD1 underflow pressure
PT04 Water support Water support pressure
PT07 Riser Riser bottom pressure
PT08 Riser Riser top pressure
PT10 Riser Riser pressure
PT11 Support Water support pressure
PT12 Air support Air support pressure
PT14 Separator SEP1 pressure
PT15 Air support Buffer tank air pressure
MFM1 Hydrocyclone HYD1 underflow flow-rate
MFM2 Hydrocyclone HYD1 input flow-rate
MFM4 Water support Water support flow-rate
CFM1 Separator SEP1 oil outlet flow-rate
CFM2 Hydrocyclone HYD1 overflow flow-rate
CFM3 Riser SEP1 input mixed flow-rate
AFM1 Air support Support air flow-rate
AFM2 Separator SEP1 air output flow-rate
dPT3 Separator Oil level
dPT4 Separator Water level
AFM1 M Air Support Control air support pressure
AFM2 M Separator Control PT14 SEP1 pressure
CV22 Separator Misdirect water flow
CV04 Hydrocyclone Control dPT4 water level
CV09 Hydrocyclone Control PDR from PT01-03
hydrocyclone is used to control the water level of the
separator, and the overflow control valve for controlling
the PDR. Since oil is not used in the mixture, the quality
of the PDR control is of no importance to the test.
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Esbjerg, Denmark. May 30 - June 1, 2018
226
2.1 Alarms
Alarm limits have been assigned to all sensor signals. The
alarm limits for the pressure sensors have been defined
based on recommendations from a process expert. For
those pressure sensors where the pressure influences the
process performance, the limits have been defined as a
deviation in percentage of 10 % for low and high, and
20 % for low low and high high. The deviation is from
either the control setpoint, or the mean of 20 minutes of
normal operation. All alarm limits for flow rate sensors
have been defined as a deviation of a percentage from
normal operation, similar to how the pressure alarms were
defined. The sensor values are sampled with a frequency
of 100 Hz which have been averaged to produce a signal of
1 Hz. To avoid frequent changes to alarm states, an alarm
state change is acknowledged after 5 consecutive seconds.
All alarm state changes which do not comply with this rule
are disregarded.
3. MFM MODEL
For an overview of the MFM methodology refer to the
introduction on modelling with MFM by Lind (2011), and
to Zhang et al. (2013) for the rules on reasoning about
causes and consequences.
The MFM model of the pilot plant shown in Fig. 2
consists of one mass flow structure, and two energy flow
structures. Each flow structure contains functions, that
represent the plant functionality, and the causal relations
between the functions. An energy flow structure represents
the conversion of electrical energy into either energy loss
or rotational (kinetic energy) in the pump. The mass
flow structure represents the flow of the air and water
mixture, whereas the energy flow structure of the mixture,
represents the energy contained in the air and water.
For this reason, flow rate sensors are associated with
transport functions and the water level sensor with a
storage function in the mass flow structure. The pressure
sensors are associated with storage functions in the energy
flow structure. The functions associated with sensors are
shown as blue in Fig. 2.
The model is a hypergraph of functions and objectives,
connected by causal relations. Each function has a state
corresponding to alarm states. Initially all states are nor-
mal during normal operation, and if an alarm is triggered
as high for a pressure sensor, the corresponding storage
function in MFM changes state from normal to high. This
state is then propagated to adjacent functions dependent
on the causal relations, to determine which functions and
states could cause this change. The alarm states of all
sensor signals low low, low, normal, high or high high are
used for reasoning about potential causes.
The reasoning is triggered when an alarm state appears.
MFM is then used to identify the possible root causes for
all present alarm states. The purpose is thus for MFM to
infer causes that are physically valid for those alarms, and
in this particular case to infer that the actual root cause,
the function representing CV22, has been breached.
4. EMULATED FAULT
The fault emulated on the pilot plant is a misdirected flow
from CV22, between the separator and the hydrocyclone.
By opening CV22 from 0 to 10 %, water is redirected from
the water outlet of the separator directly to the water stor-
age tank MT02, and thus bypasses the hydrocyclone. The
first 800 seconds of the experiment is used for pressurising
the three-phase separator to reach normal operation. After
900 seconds CV22 is opened by 10 %, and remains open
until the system trips after 1198 seconds due to a low low
water level. The following is a physical description of the
consequences of the misdirected flow.
The pipe of the misdirected flow is of a larger diameter and
provides a shorter return with less flow restrictions and
therefore less resistance to flow. As a result of this extra
pipe in parallel, more water flows out of the separator,
and the separator is now in a state with a larger outflow
than inflow. Due to this, the level drops steadily as
shown for the signal dPT4 in Fig. 3. The control system
tries to avoid this by closing CV04, but the leakage is
too big; and thus CV04 closes entirely. As CV04 closes,
the pressure PT03 increases. This results in the PDR
controller slightly closing CV09 on average, leading to
an increase of PT02 on average. However CV09, and
therefore also PT02 and CFM02 oscillates due to the
poorly tuned PDR controller. Closing CV04 leads to a
significant decrease in flow through the hydrocyclone, as
indicated in Fig. 3 for MFM01 and MFM02. The level
controller keeps the control valve CV04 closed as the level
stays below the setpoint of 23 cm.
As the separator pressure drops below the setpoint of 7
bars, the pressure controller closes AFM02 M. This can
be seen in Fig. 3 where the flow rate of air AFM02 drops
to zero.
As the water level drops, the compressed air is allowed to
expand and the separator pressure PT14 drops. This drop
in separator pressure means that the pump, controlled
at constant power, has less resistance. As a result of
the separator pressure continuously dropping, the pump
can thus deliver a higher inflow rate to the separator, as
can be seen for MFM04 and CFM03 on 3. At the same
time, the lower separator pressure should also decrease the
misdirected flow rate as there is now a lower differential
pressure between the separator and the supply tank.
However, the level continues to decrease, thus indicating
that the misdirected flow is still larger than the inflow to
the separator.
The water level continues to decrease whereas the pressure
PT14 stabilizes after a while. The level in the separator is
decreasing due to a larger outflow than inflow of water.
The difference between the inflow and the outflow gives
the rate of change of the liquid volume in the separator.
As water leaves the separator the air fills out this volume
by expanding. An expansion of the air leads to a decrease
in pressure, and as the pressure drops; the flow rate of the
separator outflow decreases whereas the inlet flow rate of
air and water increases. The rate of change in volume is
thus smaller, resulting in a smaller air expansion, and thus
also a smaller decrease of the separator pressure PT14.
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2.1 Alarms
Alarm limits have been assigned to all sensor signals. The
alarm limits for the pressure sensors have been defined
based on recommendations from a process expert. For
those pressure sensors where the pressure influences the
process performance, the limits have been defined as a
deviation in percentage of 10 % for low and high, and
20 % for low low and high high. The deviation is from
either the control setpoint, or the mean of 20 minutes of
normal operation. All alarm limits for flow rate sensors
have been defined as a deviation of a percentage from
normal operation, similar to how the pressure alarms were
defined. The sensor values are sampled with a frequency
of 100 Hz which have been averaged to produce a signal of
1 Hz. To avoid frequent changes to alarm states, an alarm
state change is acknowledged after 5 consecutive seconds.
All alarm state changes which do not comply with this rule
are disregarded.
3. MFM MODEL
For an overview of the MFM methodology refer to the
introduction on modelling with MFM by Lind (2011), and
to Zhang et al. (2013) for the rules on reasoning about
causes and consequences.
The MFM model of the pilot plant shown in Fig. 2
consists of one mass flow structure, and two energy flow
structures. Each flow structure contains functions, that
represent the plant functionality, and the causal relations
between the functions. An energy flow structure represents
the conversion of electrical energy into either energy loss
or rotational (kinetic energy) in the pump. The mass
flow structure represents the flow of the air and water
mixture, whereas the energy flow structure of the mixture,
represents the energy contained in the air and water.
For this reason, flow rate sensors are associated with
transport functions and the water level sensor with a
storage function in the mass flow structure. The pressure
sensors are associated with storage functions in the energy
flow structure. The functions associated with sensors are
shown as blue in Fig. 2.
The model is a hypergraph of functions and objectives,
connected by causal relations. Each function has a state
corresponding to alarm states. Initially all states are nor-
mal during normal operation, and if an alarm is triggered
as high for a pressure sensor, the corresponding storage
function in MFM changes state from normal to high. This
state is then propagated to adjacent functions dependent
on the causal relations, to determine which functions and
states could cause this change. The alarm states of all
sensor signals low low, low, normal, high or high high are
used for reasoning about potential causes.
The reasoning is triggered when an alarm state appears.
MFM is then used to identify the possible root causes for
all present alarm states. The purpose is thus for MFM to
infer causes that are physically valid for those alarms, and
in this particular case to infer that the actual root cause,
the function representing CV22, has been breached.
4. EMULATED FAULT
The fault emulated on the pilot plant is a misdirected flow
from CV22, between the separator and the hydrocyclone.
By opening CV22 from 0 to 10 %, water is redirected from
the water outlet of the separator directly to the water stor-
age tank MT02, and thus bypasses the hydrocyclone. The
first 800 seconds of the experiment is used for pressurising
the three-phase separator to reach normal operation. After
900 seconds CV22 is opened by 10 %, and remains open
until the system trips after 1198 seconds due to a low low
water level. The following is a physical description of the
consequences of the misdirected flow.
The pipe of the misdirected flow is of a larger diameter and
provides a shorter return with less flow restrictions and
therefore less resistance to flow. As a result of this extra
pipe in parallel, more water flows out of the separator,
and the separator is now in a state with a larger outflow
than inflow. Due to this, the level drops steadily as
shown for the signal dPT4 in Fig. 3. The control system
tries to avoid this by closing CV04, but the leakage is
too big; and thus CV04 closes entirely. As CV04 closes,
the pressure PT03 increases. This results in the PDR
controller slightly closing CV09 on average, leading to
an increase of PT02 on average. However CV09, and
therefore also PT02 and CFM02 oscillates due to the
poorly tuned PDR controller. Closing CV04 leads to a
significant decrease in flow through the hydrocyclone, as
indicated in Fig. 3 for MFM01 and MFM02. The level
controller keeps the control valve CV04 closed as the level
stays below the setpoint of 23 cm.
As the separator pressure drops below the setpoint of 7
bars, the pressure controller closes AFM02 M. This can
be seen in Fig. 3 where the flow rate of air AFM02 drops
to zero.
As the water level drops, the compressed air is allowed to
expand and the separator pressure PT14 drops. This drop
in separator pressure means that the pump, controlled
at constant power, has less resistance. As a result of
the separator pressure continuously dropping, the pump
can thus deliver a higher inflow rate to the separator, as
can be seen for MFM04 and CFM03 on 3. At the same
time, the lower separator pressure should also decrease the
misdirected flow rate as there is now a lower differential
pressure between the separator and the supply tank.
However, the level continues to decrease, thus indicating
that the misdirected flow is still larger than the inflow to
the separator.
The water level continues to decrease whereas the pressure
PT14 stabilizes after a while. The level in the separator is
decreasing due to a larger outflow than inflow of water.
The difference between the inflow and the outflow gives
the rate of change of the liquid volume in the separator.
As water leaves the separator the air fills out this volume
by expanding. An expansion of the air leads to a decrease
in pressure, and as the pressure drops; the flow rate of the
separator outflow decreases whereas the inlet flow rate of
air and water increases. The rate of change in volume is
thus smaller, resulting in a smaller air expansion, and thus
also a smaller decrease of the separator pressure PT14.
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Fig. 2. MFM Model of PWT Pilot Plant modelled in EGOLF.
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Fig. 3. Selected sensor signals and triggered alarms over time.
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At approximately 1000 s an equilibrium occurs between
the expansion of the air, and the added mass of air.
The pressure thus levels off even though the water level
is still decreasing. As the separator pressure PT14 stops
decreasing, the inlet flow rate CFM3 stabilizes.
The pressure at PT01 (the inlet of the hydroclycone)
decreases in the same manner as the pressure in the
separator at PT14, as it is connected to the outlet pipe
of the separator. The main difference is an offset, due to
the difference in hydrostatic pressure, as the flow rate is
very low.
5. RESULTS
The sensor signals and the triggered alarm states are
shown in Fig. 3. To simplify the presentation of the
reasoning results, the test has been divided into three time
periods: 908 s - 943 s, 944 s - 1062 s and 1063 s - 1998 s. In
the time between 924 s and 943 s the normal alarm state
of PT03 is assumed to be high to reduce the number of
presented time periods.
In this section the fault will be discussed from the view-
point of an operator, based on the triggered alarm states,
and the inferred causes will be discussed in relation to the
triggered alarms.
5.1 Triggered alarms
In the first period the first alarm is triggered at 902 s.
The air flow rate out of the separation tank is triggered as
AFM2:Low Low. Within the next 6 seconds, the flow rate
of the mixed water and air into the separator becomes
CFM3:High, the flow rate and pressure at the hydrocy-
clone underflow becomesMFM1:Low Low and PT03:High,
and the input flow rate to the hydrocyclone becomes
MFM2:Low Low. The last alarm is triggered shortly after
the fault at 908 s. It is the flow rate from the pump, which
increases to MFM4:High High. The underflow pressure
alarm PT03 stops at 925 s, and the state becomes normal.
However for simplicity it is considered to be high.
An operator would see more water entering the three-phase
separator, but air is not leaving through the gas outlet,
and the water cannot leave through the hydrocyclone
underflow. The controllers indicate, that the separator air
outlet valve is closed, and that the underflow valve is
closed. This means that more water enters the separator,
but only very little water exits through the overflow of the
hydrocyclone. If more water enters the separator, but less
water and air leaves it, either air or water must be leaving
the separator, otherwise somewhere downstream.
In the second period, another alarm is triggered. The
support system air flow rate alarm triggers as AFM1:High
at 944 s. In addition the alarm state PT03:High is now nor-
mal. To the operator, the alarm PT03 can be misleading
unless the operator is aware that CV04 is closed, resulting
in the high pressure initially, and now that the separator
pressure decreases, so does PT03. The AFM1 alarm can be
difficult to draw conclusions from, but could indicate that
the fault is not related to the support system, but rather
something downstream, as the flow rate has increased for
both the air and water in the support system, and not just
the air.
In the third period, the separator water level alarm triggers
as dPT4:Low at 1063s, 161 s after the first alarm. The
current alarms stay triggered until 1198 s, after which
dPT4:Low Low is triggered, and the system trips. This
alarm should merely be a confirmation of the understand-
ing which the operator would most likely have in the first
time period. However no alarms indicate exactly from
where the water leaves the separator, and it would thus
be up to the operator to investigate.
5.2 Inferred causes
The reasoning results are produced by triggering the
functions in the MFM model, which are associated with
triggered alarm states. Based on a generic set of rules
and a rule based reasoning software (Zhang et al., 2013),
the states are propagated through the model to adjacent
functions. The inferred causes from time period three are
shown in Fig. 4. Each cause is linked to the alarms which
are used as evidence to infer the specific cause. Every
inferred cause may have multiple alarms as evidence. The
sensors are associated with the blue functions in Fig. 2,
and by triggering these functions as the alarm states,
these states are then propagated to the adjacent functions.
These functions are considered as the causes shown in Fig.
4. The evidence from AFM1 is not propagated to any
adjacent functions, and is thus not included in the figure.
It can be seen in Fig. 4 that some alarms produce more
causes than other alarms, and that some causes have more
alarms as evidence than other causes.
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Fig. 4. Plot of causes inferred by MFM based on triggered
alarm states for time period three.
The reasoning results for each time period are shown in
Table 2. It can be seen in Table 2 that the actual root cause
CV22 is inferred by MFM as a cause in every time period.
This leaves the operator with 298 seconds to figure out,
exactly which of the causes is the correct. The operator is
thus introduced to the root cause at the beginning of the
fault, but has to filter away all other causes, as opposed
to only seeing alarms, where the operator may potentially
never infer the correct cause from the alarms in this test.
The number of causes inferred by MFM in each time period
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At approximately 1000 s an equilibrium occurs between
the expansion of the air, and the added mass of air.
The pressure thus levels off even though the water level
is still decreasing. As the separator pressure PT14 stops
decreasing, the inlet flow rate CFM3 stabilizes.
The pressure at PT01 (the inlet of the hydroclycone)
decreases in the same manner as the pressure in the
separator at PT14, as it is connected to the outlet pipe
of the separator. The main difference is an offset, due to
the difference in hydrostatic pressure, as the flow rate is
very low.
5. RESULTS
The sensor signals and the triggered alarm states are
shown in Fig. 3. To simplify the presentation of the
reasoning results, the test has been divided into three time
periods: 908 s - 943 s, 944 s - 1062 s and 1063 s - 1998 s. In
the time between 924 s and 943 s the normal alarm state
of PT03 is assumed to be high to reduce the number of
presented time periods.
In this section the fault will be discussed from the view-
point of an operator, based on the triggered alarm states,
and the inferred causes will be discussed in relation to the
triggered alarms.
5.1 Triggered alarms
In the first period the first alarm is triggered at 902 s.
The air flow rate out of the separation tank is triggered as
AFM2:Low Low. Within the next 6 seconds, the flow rate
of the mixed water and air into the separator becomes
CFM3:High, the flow rate and pressure at the hydrocy-
clone underflow becomesMFM1:Low Low and PT03:High,
and the input flow rate to the hydrocyclone becomes
MFM2:Low Low. The last alarm is triggered shortly after
the fault at 908 s. It is the flow rate from the pump, which
increases to MFM4:High High. The underflow pressure
alarm PT03 stops at 925 s, and the state becomes normal.
However for simplicity it is considered to be high.
An operator would see more water entering the three-phase
separator, but air is not leaving through the gas outlet,
and the water cannot leave through the hydrocyclone
underflow. The controllers indicate, that the separator air
outlet valve is closed, and that the underflow valve is
closed. This means that more water enters the separator,
but only very little water exits through the overflow of the
hydrocyclone. If more water enters the separator, but less
water and air leaves it, either air or water must be leaving
the separator, otherwise somewhere downstream.
In the second period, another alarm is triggered. The
support system air flow rate alarm triggers as AFM1:High
at 944 s. In addition the alarm state PT03:High is now nor-
mal. To the operator, the alarm PT03 can be misleading
unless the operator is aware that CV04 is closed, resulting
in the high pressure initially, and now that the separator
pressure decreases, so does PT03. The AFM1 alarm can be
difficult to draw conclusions from, but could indicate that
the fault is not related to the support system, but rather
something downstream, as the flow rate has increased for
both the air and water in the support system, and not just
the air.
In the third period, the separator water level alarm triggers
as dPT4:Low at 1063s, 161 s after the first alarm. The
current alarms stay triggered until 1198 s, after which
dPT4:Low Low is triggered, and the system trips. This
alarm should merely be a confirmation of the understand-
ing which the operator would most likely have in the first
time period. However no alarms indicate exactly from
where the water leaves the separator, and it would thus
be up to the operator to investigate.
5.2 Inferred causes
The reasoning results are produced by triggering the
functions in the MFM model, which are associated with
triggered alarm states. Based on a generic set of rules
and a rule based reasoning software (Zhang et al., 2013),
the states are propagated through the model to adjacent
functions. The inferred causes from time period three are
shown in Fig. 4. Each cause is linked to the alarms which
are used as evidence to infer the specific cause. Every
inferred cause may have multiple alarms as evidence. The
sensors are associated with the blue functions in Fig. 2,
and by triggering these functions as the alarm states,
these states are then propagated to the adjacent functions.
These functions are considered as the causes shown in Fig.
4. The evidence from AFM1 is not propagated to any
adjacent functions, and is thus not included in the figure.
It can be seen in Fig. 4 that some alarms produce more
causes than other alarms, and that some causes have more
alarms as evidence than other causes.
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Fig. 4. Plot of causes inferred by MFM based on triggered
alarm states for time period three.
The reasoning results for each time period are shown in
Table 2. It can be seen in Table 2 that the actual root cause
CV22 is inferred by MFM as a cause in every time period.
This leaves the operator with 298 seconds to figure out,
exactly which of the causes is the correct. The operator is
thus introduced to the root cause at the beginning of the
fault, but has to filter away all other causes, as opposed
to only seeing alarms, where the operator may potentially
never infer the correct cause from the alarms in this test.
The number of causes inferred by MFM in each time period
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ranges from 14 to 16. These causes need to be analysed by
an operator by taking the current state of the plant into
consideration. Instead of inferring a cause based on the
alarms, the operator now has to analyse how the causes
inferred by MFM correspond to the symptoms; the current
alarms.
To analyse the many inferred causes, each cause has been
compared to every triggered alarm state by a process
expert. The comparison is shown in Table 2. An operator
would be required to do something similar to identify the
root cause, if presented with nothing else but a list of the
18 different causes. The expert reasons about what the
plant state would be given a specific cause. If the expert
agrees with an alarm state triggered in this test, a ’+’
has been assigned. If the alarm would not be triggered,
nothing has been assigned, and if the alarm state would
be opposite of the actual state a ’-’ has been assigned. The
accuracy has been calculated for each cause, based on how
many of the triggered alarms each cause agree with (Baldi
et al., 2000). Only the two classes correct ’+’ and incorrect
are used, where incorrect corresponds to both normal and
’-’.
Based on this approach causes can be ranked. This how-
ever requires that corresponding alarm states are defined
for as many causes as possible. Thus either process experts
as in this case, or preferably data from faults are analysed
to define this relationship between causes and alarm states
as in Yang et al. (2011); Hu et al. (2017). This can then
be used to rank causes in on-line diagnosis, or instead to
improve the models in advance.
If only considering the six causes inferred by the reasoning
of MFM, which has an accuracy of 0.75 and higher, only
one cause is not proposed through all three time periods,
and is not proposed in period one. One thing all of these
six causes have in common, is that they are related to the
separator. They indicate that too much water or air exits
the separator, that the valve CV22 at the separator outlet
has been breached or that the pressure or level controller
is failing. The valve CV04 of the level control and the
valve AFM2 M of the pressure control are both closed as
intended. In addition the alarm state of AFM2 and MFM1
indicate either no or a very low flow rate. Thus, when valve
positions are taken into account causes No. 2 and 5 seem
unlikely and could be disregarded. Cause No. 3 explains
that water exits the separator, but not where, whereas
cause No. 1 explains exactly where. The fourth cause
is air exiting the pressure safety valve. As the pressure
PT14 is not near the pressure limit of the separator, air
leaving through the PSV would be unintended. However
if pressure would decrease because of too much air leaving
the separator, the water level would be increasing, instead
of decreasing.
Two of the causes have an accuracy of 0. As the overflow of
the hydrocyclone has only little influence on the system,
it merely affects the oil and water separation efficiency.
Similarly the air and water separation influences the
quality of the separation process. This corresponds to
either air being part of the water fraction or water being
part of the air fraction. Thus no alarms are expected to be
triggered based on this, and they are only related to the
process quality. The MFM model should thus be changed
to better represent the hydrocyclone.
5.3 Discussion
The number of alarms and causes over time can be seen
in Fig. 5. For each alarm, there are approximately two
inferred causes. This becomes problematic, as the purpose
is to reduce the amount of information presented to
an operator, instead of increasing it. To mitigate this
issue, the model size and complexity can be reduced,
but the amount of different possible causes which can
then be inferred, also reduces. For this reason, an index
indicating the complexity, size and detail of the model,
should be used in combination with a measurement of the
diagnostic performance. In this way the model size is not
simply reduced, just to limit the number of inferred causes
presented to an operator, as the model size also introduces
more different causes. Alternatively, the MFM reasoning
method could be combined with alternative methods such
as Bayesian Networks similar to Khalil et al. (2016) to
rank causes based on probabilities.
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Fig. 5. Plot of triggered alarms, causes, and the ratio
between causes and alarms over time.
As shown in Fig. 5, the number of causes per alarm
decreases significantly in the beginning of the experiment,
as more alarms trigger. This can however also be based on
the reach of each alarm in the MFM model. If a function
can propagate to many other functions, the causes per
alarms will increase. The relationship between the number
of causes and the number of alarms decreases significantly
as more alarms are triggered. A low ratio is beneficial,
but the total amount of causes is high, and methods for
reducing the number should be developed.
There is currently no method for the MFMmethodology to
determine how likely one cause is over another. The MFM
model proposes 16 different causes based on 6 alarms in
time period 1, 14 causes based on 6 alarms in period 2 and
15 causes based on 7 alarms in period 3. This shows that
MFM currently requires improvements to either the rea-
soning, the modelling or the alarm thresholds, in order to
bring down the number of inferred causes to a reasonable
level for use in decision support for operators. The authors
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Table 2. Reasoning results for time periods and their validity for the triggered alarms
(abbreviated names).
Inferred cause Period Alarms
No. Explanation State 1 2 3 P3 M1 M2 M4 C3 A1 A2 d4 Accuracy
1 CV22 Breached x x x + + + + + + + + 1.00
2 Level dPT4 control Fail x x x + + + + + + + + 1.00
3 SEP1 water exit High High x x x + + + + + + + + 1.00
4 PSV air exit Breach x x x - + + + + + + - 0.75
5 Pressure PT14 control Fail x x x - + + + + + + - 0.75
6 Air exit SEP1 High x - + + + + + + - 0.75
7 Air trans SEP1 air outlet High High x x x - + + + + + - - 0.63
8 Pump energy loss High x x x + + + - - + - 0.50
9 Energy trans HYD1 underflow Low x x x + + + 0.38
10 Energy trans HYD1 input High x + - - + + - 0.38
11 Pump power High High x x x - - - + + - 0.25
12 Air supply energy trans. High x x x + + 0.25
13 Water trans SEP1 outlet Low Low x x - + + - - - - - 0.25
14 Overflow energy transport Low x + - + - 0.25
15 Energy transport to SEP1 Low x x x + 0.13
16 Weir Breached x - - - - - - - + 0.13
17 Energy trans HYD1 overflow High High x x x 0.00
18 Air and water separation Leak x x x 0.00
suggest the following solutions to reduce the number of
causes presented:
(1) A method for validating models according to trig-
gered alarms could improve the cause predictions for
on-line fault diagnosis with MFM models. Causal
relations of models are thus revised so that inferred
causes correspond to the triggered alarms to a higher
degree.
(2) A method for cause ranking, filtering, grouping or
something similar would be beneficial to automati-
cally falsify or reduce the number of inferred causes.
(3) Alternative methods to traditional alarms for trig-
gering functions in models. E.g. thresholds for MFM
models only.
Currently, a causal relation is established between two
functions of an MFM model, if one function can influence
the other. When modelling, there is no consideration of
the magnitude of influence. The validation approach would
require that numerous faults are emulated or simulated, so
that process experts would not be involved in comparing
alarm states to causes, as done in this approach to produce
Table 2. Based on the emulated and simulated data, the
causal relations in the MFM models should be updated,
so that specific causes do not appear for specific alarms.
The causal relations would then be established based on
whether a change of one function can cause a deviation of
another function, significantly large to trigger an alarm or
compromise the safety of the plant. However, the MFM
model loses its property of generalizing plant behaviour,
the more strictly this approach is applied.
6. CONCLUSION
A produced water treatment pilot plant has been modeled
with Multilevel Flow Modeling, for the purpose of on-line
fault diagnosis for operator decision support. A fault has
been emulated on the plant, by opening a closed valve such
that the water flow is misdirected. The alarms triggered
over time, are used as evidence for defining state changes
of MFM functions.
The MFM model represents the system well for this
specific fault, as the majority of the inferred causes to some
degree comply with the alarms triggered by the fault. The
majority of causes have discrepancies with the triggered
alarms, except for the actual root cause. Multilevel Flow
Modeling is capable of inferring the root cause of the
emulated fault. For presentation of the results, they have
been divided into three time periods. The root cause is
inferred by MFM in all three time periods leaving the
operator with a potential of 298 seconds to react.
The MFM model produces approximately two causes per
alarm for this fault. The amount of information thus
increases compared to only using alarms. For this reason
model validation based on emulated or simulated faults is
suggested, instead of solely relying on input from process
experts. In addition cause filtering, ranking or grouping
should be introduced along with an index indicating the
model complexity.
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Table 2. Reasoning results for time periods and their validity for the triggered alarms
(abbreviated names).
Inferred cause Period Alarms
No. Explanation State 1 2 3 P3 M1 M2 M4 C3 A1 A2 d4 Accuracy
1 CV22 Breached x x x + + + + + + + + 1.00
2 Level dPT4 control Fail x x x + + + + + + + + 1.00
3 SEP1 water exit High High x x x + + + + + + + + 1.00
4 PSV air exit Breach x x x - + + + + + + - 0.75
5 Pressure PT14 control Fail x x x - + + + + + + - 0.75
6 Air exit SEP1 High x - + + + + + + - 0.75
7 Air trans SEP1 air outlet High High x x x - + + + + + - - 0.63
8 Pump energy loss High x x x + + + - - + - 0.50
9 Energy trans HYD1 underflow Low x x x + + + 0.38
10 Energy trans HYD1 input High x + - - + + - 0.38
11 Pump power High High x x x - - - + + - 0.25
12 Air supply energy trans. High x x x + + 0.25
13 Water trans SEP1 outlet Low Low x x - + + - - - - - 0.25
14 Overflow energy transport Low x + - + - 0.25
15 Energy transport to SEP1 Low x x x + 0.13
16 Weir Breached x - - - - - - - + 0.13
17 Energy trans HYD1 overflow High High x x x 0.00
18 Air and water separation Leak x x x 0.00
suggest the following solutions to reduce the number of
causes presented:
(1) A method for validating models according to trig-
gered alarms could improve the cause predictions for
on-line fault diagnosis with MFM models. Causal
relations of models are thus revised so that inferred
causes correspond to the triggered alarms to a higher
degree.
(2) A method for cause ranking, filtering, grouping or
something similar would be beneficial to automati-
cally falsify or reduce the number of inferred causes.
(3) Alternative methods to traditional alarms for trig-
gering functions in models. E.g. thresholds for MFM
models only.
Currently, a causal relation is established between two
functions of an MFM model, if one function can influence
the other. When modelling, there is no consideration of
the magnitude of influence. The validation approach would
require that numerous faults are emulated or simulated, so
that process experts would not be involved in comparing
alarm states to causes, as done in this approach to produce
Table 2. Based on the emulated and simulated data, the
causal relations in the MFM models should be updated,
so that specific causes do not appear for specific alarms.
The causal relations would then be established based on
whether a change of one function can cause a deviation of
another function, significantly large to trigger an alarm or
compromise the safety of the plant. However, the MFM
model loses its property of generalizing plant behaviour,
the more strictly this approach is applied.
6. CONCLUSION
A produced water treatment pilot plant has been modeled
with Multilevel Flow Modeling, for the purpose of on-line
fault diagnosis for operator decision support. A fault has
been emulated on the plant, by opening a closed valve such
that the water flow is misdirected. The alarms triggered
over time, are used as evidence for defining state changes
of MFM functions.
The MFM model represents the system well for this
specific fault, as the majority of the inferred causes to some
degree comply with the alarms triggered by the fault. The
majority of causes have discrepancies with the triggered
alarms, except for the actual root cause. Multilevel Flow
Modeling is capable of inferring the root cause of the
emulated fault. For presentation of the results, they have
been divided into three time periods. The root cause is
inferred by MFM in all three time periods leaving the
operator with a potential of 298 seconds to react.
The MFM model produces approximately two causes per
alarm for this fault. The amount of information thus
increases compared to only using alarms. For this reason
model validation based on emulated or simulated faults is
suggested, instead of solely relying on input from process
experts. In addition cause filtering, ranking or grouping
should be introduced along with an index indicating the
model complexity.
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